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WERE THERE ADEQUATE STATE
GROUNDS IN BUSH v. GORE?
Michael L. Wells*
Few Supreme Court decisions provoke the immediate and
intensely negative verdict that law professors passed on Bush v.
Gore. 1 It usually takes some time for scholars to digest the opinions, reflect on the majority's reasoning, and render considered
judgments. Not so in this case. Within a few days of the 5-4 ruling that halted the recounting of votes for presidential electors in
Florida, the decision drew withering criticism from scholars
across the ideological spectrum. Akhil Amar lamented in the
Los Angeles Times that he must now tell his students not to put
their trust in judges, even though he considers himself "a friend
of the U.S. Supreme Court and of many of its current justices";2
Jeffrey Rosen called the decision a "disgrace" on the cover of
the New Republic; 3 and Herman Schwartz accused the Court of
"trampl[ing] on ... [b]asic principles of adjudication." 4
Some of the criticism is deserved. 5 Professor Amar made a
powerful case against the majority's ruling that the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court violated the equal protection clause for failure to use uniform standards throughout the
state. Amar pointed out that vote counting standards vary from
* Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia. The author wishes to
thank Laura Fitzgerald, Barry Friedman, Lonny Hoffman, Richard Nagarada, and
Robert Schapiro for helpful comments on a draft of this article.
1. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
2. Akhil Reed Amar, Supreme Court: Should We Trust Judges?, Los Angeles
Times M1 (Dec. 17, 2000).
3. Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace, New Republic 18 (Dec. 25, 2000).
4. Herman Schwartz, The God That Failed, The Nation 5, 6 (Jan. 1, 2001).
5. Some of it seems rather unfair. For example, Professor Rosen detects similarities between the five Justices in the majority and former President Clinton: "It will be
impossible to look at O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas in the same
light again, much as it was impossible to look at President Clinton in the same light after
seeing him exposed in the Starr Report." Rosen, Disgrace at 20 (cited in note 3). Vincent
Bugliosi thinks that his "background in criminal law is sufficient to inform you that
Scalia, Thomas et al. are criminals in the very truest sense of the word." Vincent
Bugliosi, None Dare Cal! It Treason, The Nation 11, 14 (Feb. 5, 2001).
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locality to locality all over the nation, that they always have, and
that the Court could cite no precedent to support its equal protection theory. Others have questioned whether the ruling rests
on any general principle at all, given the care the Court took to
limit its reasoning to the extraordinary circumstances of the
Florida presidential election.6 Even Michael McConnell, a wellknown conservative scholar, was troubled by the implications of
the holding. By reaching the equal protection issue, the Court
evidently accepted the notion that recounts were appropriate in
connection with the election contest. Yet the Court put a stop to
the recount that was underway. McConnell observed that "[t]he
court did not have the resolution to declare that no recount was
necessary, or the patience to declare that a proper recount
should proceed. " 7
It is all too easy to leap from this well-founded critique of
the Court's reasoning to the conclusion that the majority-all of
whom were appointed by Republican presidents-were bent on
installing George W. Bush in the White House by any means
they could find, and that the holding rests not at all on law but
solely on naked politics. 8 Putting aside the majority's reasoning,
a better ground on which to defend Bush is that the Florida Supreme Court (the "Florida Court") violated article II, § 1, clause
2 of the Constitution, which provides that "[e]ach state shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct,
[presidential] electors." 9 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas (the "plurality"), advanced an argument along these lines, and the four dissenters devoted parts of their opinions to refuting it. Though the
plurality grasped the basic issue in Bush, it did not make the best
case for reversal. The dissenters understandably responded only
to the plurality's weak arguments and not the stronger ones that
should have been marshaled for reversal.
The Chief Justice was right to be concerned about article II,
but committed a critical error in his treatment of the "adequate
and independent state ground" doctrine. The plurality was confronted with a state court opinion that did not purport to rely on
federal law. If we leave equal protection out of the analysis (as I
6. Amy Waldman, Ruling Will Hold a Place, As Yet Unclear, in History, N.Y.
Times A32 (Dec. 14, 2000) (attributing this view to Frank Michelman).
7. Michael W. McConnell, A Muddled Ruling, Wall St. J. A26 (Dec. 14, 2000).
8. See, e.g., Bugliosi, None Dare Call it Treason at 11 (cited in note 5). (advancing
this view); Jonathan Chait, Not Equal, New Republic 14, 15 (Dec. 25, 2000) (similar).
9. U.S. Const. Art. II,§ 1, cl. 2.
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do throughout the remainder of this article), the threshold question is how one justifies the Court's exercise of jurisdiction, for
state courts are sovereign over matters of state law. The general
rule is that the Supreme Court may review a case from a state
court unless the state court judgment rests on an adequate and
independent state ground. The plurality rightly found that, despite the Florida Court's failure to address federal article II issues, there was not an adequate state ground here.
But the plurality was right for the wrong reason. The "adequate state ground" doctrine is complex and sophisticated. It
consists of not one but four principles for determining adequacy,
with the choice among them depending on the relation between
federal and state law in the case at hand. The plurality confused
two of its branches and placed Bush in the wrong doctrinal category. Worse, the category in which the plurality put the case
demands a stronger showing to justify Supreme Court review
than the one to which Bush should have been assigned. The plurality cited cases which hold that the state ruling should stand
unless the state court distorted state law in order to evade federal protections. The proper rule for Bush is that the state
court's reasoning deserves no deference. The existence of a federal constraint on state court authority, such as article II, is sufficient to justify intervention. As a result of Rehnquist's miscue,
the dissenters had little difficulty in rebutting the plurality's justifications for review. Had Rehnquist advanced the more compelling arguments for Supreme Court review that were available to
him, the article II challenge could not have been rebuffed with
such ease.
While my argument that the plurality and the dissents went
astray in their treatment of the adequate state ground doctrine
bolsters the result in Bush, it does not necessarily imply that the
plurality was right on the merits. Whether the state grounds
could withstand scrutiny under the proper test is a separate question from whether the Justices used the right test in the first
place. My focus is on the latter issue. As far as the analysis in
this paper is concerned, the Florida Court's judgment may still
be defensible.
I

Chief Justice Rehnquist began by acknowledging that "[i]n
most cases, comity and respect for federalism compel us to defer
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to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law. " 10 But that
principle did not apply to Bush, because this was not an ordinary
state law case. Federal law is also relevant to its disposition, for
article 11-with its command that "the Legislature ... direct[s]" 11
the manner of choosing electors-is one of "a few exceptional
cases in which the Constitution imposes a duty or confers a
power on a particular branch of a State's government. " 12 Therefore, "the text of the election law itself, and not just its interpretation b1 the courts of the States, takes on independent significance."1 A "significant departure" from that text by the Florida
courts "presents a federal constitutional question." 14
Having identified a federal interest at stake in the case, the
plurality proceeded to invoke the doctrine on Supreme Court
review of the adequacy of state grounds. It cited a number of
cases in which the state court relied on state law, yet the Supreme Court reviewed and overturned the judgments. The general principle underlying such cases is that, in the event a ruling
on state law has adverse impact on a federal right, "the Constitution requires [the] Court to undertake an independent, if still
deferential, analysis of state law." 15 The plurality identified two
major problems with the decisions of the Florida Court. First,
the Florida Court had taken away authority that the election
statute assigned to other officers, including the Secretary of State
and the local canvassing boards, to determine when and for what
purpose hand recounts would be undertaken. 16 Second, the
Florida Court justified its intervention by broadly reading the
statutory term "legal vote" as imposing an obligation on election
officials to count ballots that the voting machines could not read.
Rehnquist countered that the Florida statutes place the responsibility upon the voters to ensure that the machines can read
their votes. Hence, "[n]o reasonable person" could find that a
contest should succeed "when electronic or electromechanical
equipment performs precisely in the manner designed, and fails
to count those ballots that are not marked in the manner that
these voting instructions explicitly and prominently specify."17
10. Bush, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rchnquist, C.J., concurring).
11. Id. Justice Rehnquist italicized the word "Legislature" when he quoted this
language.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 114.
16. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 116 (discussing the authority of these officers).
17. Id. at 119.
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In ruling differently, the Florida Court had rejected the Secretary of State's interpretation of the statutory provisions, though
Florida law requires it to defer to her on such issues. 18
Four members of the Court dissented from the judgment,
and all of them took the time to address the plurality's theory of
the case as well. The dissenters accepted the plurality's view that
the key issue was the scope of Supreme Court review of the state
law grounds on which the Florida judgment rested, but each of
them found fault with Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning.
Though they emphasized different aspects of the case, they all
made the same point: While the Florida Court's reasoning could
be faulted, it did nothing out of the ordinary. 19 The Florida
Court engaged in the kind of legal reasoning that is typical of
courts,20 and the Supreme Court should not interfere with its rulings on issues of state law. 21
All seven justices who addressed the relevance of article II
took the wrong doctrinal path. As a result, none of them focused their attention on the constitutional issue that needed to
be addressed in order to determine whether the Florida Court
acted properly. In particular, the plurality's error in resorting to
a particular group of "adequate state ground" cases deflected attention from the question of whether the Florida Court's ruling
was compatible with article II, and enabled the dissenters to
avoid that issue as well. The mistake is understandable, for all
concerned were under tremendous time pressure, the Florida
Court did focus on state law, and the case raises a novel constitutional issue. The Justices were dealing with an aspect of Supreme Court review doctrine that rarely arises in litigation and
has never received sustained attention from the Court. Anyone
can make a mistake about the application of an ill-defined doctrine in an unfamiliar constitutional context, especially when one
is in a hurry.
II

In most legal systems there is one sovereign government,
and all law making authority resides there. The more complex
18. Id. at 120.
19. Id. at 131 (Souter, J., dissenting).
20. Bush, 531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). (The decisions of the Florida
Court "were rooted in long-established precedent and were consistent with the relevant
statutory provisions, taken as a whole.")
21. Id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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American federal system divides lawmaking authority between
the national government and the state governments. Moreover,
federal law rarely displaces state authority entirely. Typically,
some of the questions in a case are matters of federal law, but
others may be governed by state law, and it is not always clear
which body of law controls a particular issue. While federal law
prevails in any contest between state and federal law, the states
are free to proceed as they wish in the absence of conflict with
federal law. The Supreme Court's role is to see that federal law
receives the respect it deserves from the state courts, no more
and no less. Consequently, the availability of Supreme Court review of a state court decision depends on whether the state ruling in some way implicates federal law. Even when federal law
is at stake in a case, the rationale for Supreme Court review is a
restraint on its scope. Because the Supreme Court may intervene only insofar as necessary to defend the federal interest and
no further, review is ordinarily limited to the federal issues. 22
At first glance these principles of federalism seem to stand
in the way of Supreme Court review in Bush, for the Florida Supreme Court relied exclusively on state law. Of course, the state
court opinion does not by itself determine what issues are at
stake. Otherwise, state courts could evade review simply by refusing to address federal issues. In Bush, all nine Justices agreed
that the Court should examine the equal protection issue, though
the state court did not consider it. But I have, for purposes of
isolating other aspects of the case, chosen to set aside the equal
protection claim. With the equal protection issue out of the
case, Supreme Court review can be justified only if there is some
other federal element that the Florida Supreme Court should
have, but did not, take into account. That federal element is
supplied by article II, which grants authority to the state legislature to direct the manner of choosing presidential electors. According to George W. Bush, the Florida Court's decision violated article II by changing the legislative scheme.
The problem with the handling of this issue by the seven
Justices who addressed it in Bush is that they put the case in the
wrong doctrinal pigeonhole, and consequently employed the
wrong standard of review for evaluating the state judgment.
Four fact patterns give rise to Supreme Court review of a state
judgment. Each of the four presents a different mix of policy
22 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1875). See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489,502-04 (1954).
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considerations and each is governed by different principles. In
order to show how the Justices erred, it will be useful to point
out the differences between these four situations.
1. Inadequate State Substantive Grounds. In one set of
cases, the state court purports to rely solely on state law, yet the
state grounds are not sufficient by themselves to sustain the
judgment. Suppose a state statute is challenged on both state
and federal grounds, as where someone claims that the provision
violates both the free speech clause of the First Amendment and
a state free speech clause. If the state court strikes the statute
down, relying exclusively on the state constitution to do so, the
Supreme Court may not review the decision. The state ground is
adequate to sustain the judgment invalidating the law, no matter
how the federal due process issue is resolved. The same result
would follow in a case where the state court relied on both the
state and federal provisions, but made it clear that the ruling on
state law was not influenced by federal law. By contrast, suppose the state court upholds the statute in an opinion that cites
no federal authority and purports to rely solely on state law.
The state ground is inadequate to support the judgment in such a
case, simply because the statute would fall if the federal issue
were resolved differently. The same result would follow, and for
the same reason, if the state upheld the statute against both the
state and federal attacks. The point is that in such a case it is irrelevant whether the state court does or does not address the
federal issue. 23
The federal interest in such a case is in assuring that federal
rights receive due regard in the state courts. When the state
court upholds the statute, with or without mentioning the federal
grounds on which it was attacked, this federal interest is threatened, for the statute may in fact violate the federal right of free
speech. But when the state court strikes down the statute on
state law grounds, there is no danger that the value of free
speech will get less respect than it deserves. Another factor that
bears on the Court's refusal to review such cases is the policy of
avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions. In such a case,
nothing the Court does will change the outcome in any event.
23. The doctrine summarized in this paragraph is discussed in detail in R. Fallon, et
al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 525-27 (Foundation
Press, 4th ed. 1996). I do not discuss the issues that arise when the state court opinion is
ambiguous as to whether it relies on state or federal grounds, see, e.g., Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032 (1983), as they have no apparent bearing on the aspect of Bush that I address in this article.
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So long as the state court does not rely on federal principles in
interpreting the state constitution, there is no federal interest in
the resolution of the state law issue, and no justification for Supreme Court review. 24
2. The Remote Federal Premise. Suppose, however, that the
state court does rely on federal free speech principles in the
course of ruling that the statute offends the state constitution.
For example, the state court may cite federal cases in deciding
that the state constitution forbids interference with commercial
speech. Or it may hold that the state's tax law exempts the salaries of federal workers from the state's income tax because there
is a federal constitutional prohibition on state taxation of certain
federal salaries. In such a case there is no danger that the state
court has failed to show sufficient respect for the federal interest.
On the contrary, the state court has done its utmost to avoid a
decision that is at odds with federal law. These have been called
"remote federal premise" cases25 because the ruling on state law
depends in some way on a premise derived from federal law.
Though the supremacy of federal law is not threatened by
the state judgment, Supreme Court may review a case of this
type. The policy underlying review is that the Court's role goes
beyond guaranteeing that state courts give federal law the respect it deserves. In addition, the Supreme Court must guard
against state courts giving too much weight to federal law. 26 In
State Tax Commission v. Van Cott/7 the Court faced the state tax
immunity issue and ruled that the state court's federal premise
was wrong. There is no federal rule forbidding the taxation of
federal salaries. 28 In Van Cott, the Court did not simply reverse
the judgment. It remanded the case so that the state court could
decide the state tax immunity issue free of the influence of a
faulty federal premise. As it happens, the state court affirmed its
24. See Fallon, et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System at 524 (cited in
note 23).
25. Peter W. Low and John C. Jeffries, Jr., Federal Courts and the Law of FederalState Relations 86 (Foundation Press, 4th ed. 1998).
26. Of course, one could argue, as Justice Stevens has,. that this federal interest is
ordinarily not strong enough to warrant a grant of certiorari. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 695, 697 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fallon, et al., The Federal
Courts and the Federal System at 536 (cited in note 23). No one questions the existence
of a federal interest in such cases, though its strength may be debatable.
27. State Tax Comm. of Utah v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511 (1939). See Ronald J.
Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 289, 320 (1969).
28. The state court's error was understandable. It had relied on an earlier Supreme
Court case that the Court overruled on the same day it decided VanCott. See Van Cott,
306 U.S. at 515.
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earlier ruling. 29 Similarly, in cases where some of the state
judges whose votes are necessary to the judgment have relied on
state law and others on federal law, the Court may review the
judgment, correct any errors in the relevant judges' understanding of federal law, and remand for the state court to proceed as it
sees fit. 30
3. State Procedural Grounds. Federal substantive rights are
often litigated in state court proceedings, especially criminal
proceedings in which various provisions of the bill of rights may
be at issue. Litigants seeking to assert federal rights in state
court are ordinarily expected to comply with state procedural
rules. For example, the state rule may require that objections to
the introduction of evidence be made contemporaneously with
the proffer, so that the issue can be decided before any problem
of jury prejudice arises. Now suppose a criminal defendant has
federal law grounds for challenging the introduction of evidence,
for example, an argument that the evidence was obtained by a
search that violated his fourth amendment rights. If his lawyer
does not make the objection at the proper time under state law,
the client will ordinarily be deemed to have waived the right. 31
On a superficial level cases of this type resemble the adequate state ground cases. In both fact patterns, the state ground
may be adequate to support the judgment. Indeed, the Supreme
Court will generally respect a valid state procedural rule and uphold the state court's refusal to ignore the litigant's "procedural
default." But the similarity vanishes when one considers the policy issues bearing on the state procedural grounds cases. While
federal rights are not threatened by a state court decision striking down a state statute on state substantive grounds, the same
cannot be said of a decision to uphold a state judgment resting
on state procedural grounds. In such a case the state court has
refused to protect federal rights because of a state procedural
rule, and the effect of respecting the state ground is precisely the
opposite of that in the inadequate state ground cases.
No doubt for that reason, the Supreme Court shows less respect for state procedural grounds than for substantive
grounds. 32 Instead of simply accepting the state's claim that it
29. VanCott v. State Tax Comm, 98 Utah 264,96 P.2d 740 (1939).
30. See United Airlines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973).
31. For a collection of materials dealing with this problem, see Fallon, et al., The
Federal Courts and the Federal System at 566-90 (cited in note 23).
32. See id. at 576-77; Daniel Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1131-32 (1986).
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has a sufficiently strong interest in its rule to warrant the state
court's decision to ignore the federal claim, the Supreme Court
will make a judgment as to the importance the state actually accords its rule. Sometimes the Court will carefully examine the
state courts' application of state procedures in earlier cases in
order to determine just how much respect the procedural rule at
issue actually receives in the state courts. If the requirement is a
novel one or has been inconsistently applied, the Supreme Court
may pay no attention to it and reach the merits of the federal
constitutional issue. 33 Thus, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Flowers34 the Court refused to follow a state procedural rule that state
courts had not previously applied "with the pointless severity"
shown in this case.
Sometimes, the Court seems to make a judgment as to the
whether the state procedural rule actually serves any worthwhile
purpose. For example, in James v. Kentucki 5 it faced a state
rule requiring that a certain kind of objection to the charge to
the jury be called an "instruction" rather than an "admonition,"
as the criminal defendant's lawyer had labeled it. The Court
reached the merits of the constitutional issue-which related to
inferences to be drawn from a defendant's failure to testify-and
explained that the state rule was "an arid ritual of meaningless
form. "36 Though the Court in James and other procedural
ground cases often disparages the state rule, a key feature of
them is that it does not go so far as to hold the state rule unconstitutional, even as applied to the case at hand. 37 If the Court
went that far in every case where it ignored a procedural ground,
the state procedural grounds category would collapse into the
inadequate state grounds category.
4. Antecedent State Substantive Grounds. These are cases in
which state law creates a right and federal law protects that "antecedent" state right. State law is the source of most property
rights, as well as the primary source of legal protection of liberty.
Freedom of contract, for example, is mainly a product of state
law. At the same time, the federal constitution protects the
property and liberty rights that are created by state law. The just
33. See Fallon, et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System at 580 (cited in
note 23).
34. NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 294-302 (1964). See also
Fallon, et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System at 581 (cited in note 23).
35. James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341,345-48 (1984).
36. Id. at 349 (quoting Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313,320 (1958)).
37. See Meltzer, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 1160 (cited in note 32).
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compensation clause forbids governments from taking property
without paying for it, and the contracts clause obliges states to
respect their contractual obligations. 38
When a dispute arises between government and a person
who claims to hold such a right, the state court may deny relief
either because the state's interference with the right is not a constitutional violation or because the right never existed in the first
place. The former is a matter of federal law that is plainly subject to Supreme Court review. Though the latter is a ruling on
state law, there is a federal interest in its resolution, for the state
court may be suspected of having distorted its analysis of state
law in order to thwart federal protection of the right. If the state
law claim of right is a good one despite the ruling of the state
court, then the federal law protecting that right means that there
is a federal interest in the outcome of the litigation. In that
event, Supreme Court review can be justified. An example is
Indiana ex rei. Anderson v. Brand,39 in which a state statute regulated the employment rights of school teachers. When a teacher
was fired, she claimed that the state law had created a contractual right to tenure and sued for reinstatement on the ground
that this right was protected by the Contracts Clause. The state
court ruled, as a matter of state law, that no contract existed in
the first place. The Supreme Court examined the reasoning behind this holding, found it wanting, and held that state law did
indeed create a contract between the state and the teacher.
Thus, the state law ruling against the teacher violated her rights
under the Contracts Clause.
In order to grasp the policy issue raised by these claims, one
must pay attention to their structure. Their distinctive feature is
that the only substantive right at stake is a matter of state law,
yet the federal constitution is also relevant on account of the
protection it gives the state-created right. These cases differ
from those resting on inadequate state grounds, in that here a
ruling against the litigant who asserts state law claims does
threaten the federal interest in the case. They differ from category # 2, simply because there is no claim that the ruling on state
law depends on a remote federal premise. Unlike category# 3,
they do not concern state procedures through which federal
38. See Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1043, 105052 (1977); Fallon, et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System at 520-21, 551-65
(cited in note 23).
39. Indiana ex rei. Alderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
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rights are adjudicated, but state substantive rights that receive
federal protection.
Antecedent state substantive grounds cases present an especially complex relation between state and federal law. There
is a federal interest in the outcome of the state law question, yet
it remains a state law question. The latter aspect weighs in favor
of leaving its resolution to the state court, and sometimes the
Court does take a deferential view of state law. On the other
hand, the Supreme Court occasionally seems to begin from the
premise that vindicating the federal interest is important enough
to justify a de novo review of state law. A third approach is a
kind of intermediate scrutiny. The Court will "inquire whether
the decision of the state court rests upon a fair or substantial basis,"40 and uphold the state judgment "if there is no evasion of
the constitutional issue, and the nonfederal ground of decision
has fair support."41 Notice that the standard of review here resembles that of cases resting on state procedural grounds, perhaps because the underlying problem of balancing state and federal issues is roughly similar in the two types of cases. Though
the fact patterns differ, there are both state and federal interests
at stake in each category, and the federal interest cannot be vindicated without paying some attention to the state ground.
Before turning to Bush, notice one other feature of the adequate state ground doctrine: there is a significant difference between the inadequate state grounds and remote federal premises
categories, on the one hand, and the state procedural grounds
and antecedent state grounds categories on the other. If a case
falls within the first two categories, the federal interest is merely
in resolving the federal issue. So long as the state court follows
the Supreme Court's ruling on the federal issue, it may do as it
pleases with regard to state law. In the latter two categories, the
Supreme Court may not content itself with correcting issues of
federal law, for the federal interest can be vindicated only by
Supreme Court review of the state court's resolution of state law
issues. In one sense, Supreme Court review may be more deferential in such cases, as the Court acknowledges that the primary
responsibility for making state law remains with the state courts.
In another sense, Supreme Court review is more searching, sim-

40. Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944) (quoting
Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537,540 (1930)).
41. Id. See Alfred Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 941, 965
(1965).
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ply because the Court must go beyond the federal issues to examine state court rulings on state law as well.
III
Chief Justice Rehnquist committed a fatal error midway
through his opinion. The critical paragraph reads as follows:
In order to determine whether a state court has infringed
upon the legislature's authority, we necessarily must examine
the law of the State as it existed prior to the action of the
court. Though we generally defer to state courts on the interpretation of state law ... there are of course areas in which
the Constitution requires this Court to undertake an independent, if still deferential, analysis of state law. 42

Notice that, after identifying the article II issue and the need to
"examine the law of the State as it existed prior to the action of
the court" in order to resolve it, the opinion quite abruptly shifts
gears and moves into a discussion of Supreme Court review of
the state law grounds relied upon by state courts, by "an independent, if still deferential, analysis of state law." In the ensuing
discussion, he cites one procedural state ground case, NAACP v.
Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 43 in which the state had imposed a
novel procedural requirement as a ground for finding a forfeiture of federal rights. 44 Rehnquist also cites Bouie v. City of Columbia,45 in which the Court held outright that the state court's
interpretation of a criminal statute broadened the law "beyond
what a fair reading provided, in violation of due process. "46 This
constitutional ruling takes the case out of the procedural category. Since the state ground was accordingly inadequate to support the judgment without the need for any delicate weighing of
state and federal interests, this case belongs in the inadequate
state grounds category. Finally, Rehnquist cites a as antecedent
state grounds case, in which the state had created property
rights, those rights were protected by federal law, and the Supreme Court asserted the power to examine the state law underpinnings of rulings that no property right existed in the first
42. Bush, 531 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
43. NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
44. The reason why the case belongs in the procedural default category is that the
Court in NAACP did not find that the state's procedural rule or its application was unconstitutional.
45. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
46. Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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place. 47 Bush was "precisely parallel," 48 Rehnquist claimed, because the Florida Court had "impermissibly distorted" the Florida election laws "beyond what a fair reading required. "49
Pursuing this framework of analysis throughout the remainder of his opinion, the Chief Justice concluded that "[n]o reasonable person"50 would read one provision of state law as the
Florida Court had done. Another aspect of the ruling was "absurd,"51 and another was "peculiar." 52 Rehnquist's reasoning
takes for granted the proposition that his task is to examine the
state law grounds under the deferential standards of the state
procedural grounds and the antecedent state grounds categories.53 The dissents eagerly endorsed the plurality's focus on the
state court's state law reasoning and the plurality's willingness to
employ a deferential standard of review of that reasoning. Justice Stevens found that the "Florida Supreme Court ~did not]
make any substantive change in Florida electoral law. "5 Justice
Souter insisted that "[n]one of the state court's interpretations is
unreasonable to the point of displacing the legislative enactment."55 Justice Ginsberg found "no reason to upset ~the Florida
Court's] reasoned interpretation of Florida law." 6 Justice
Breyer examined the state law grounds and found no "impermissible distortion" of the election law. 57
In citing state procedural grounds precedent and especially
in characterizing Bush as a "fair support" case, the plurality
made both an analytical error and a strategic blunder. The analytical error was a failure to appreciate the structural differences
between Bush and there procedural ground and fair support
47. Id. at 115 n.l (citing Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (1813)).
In this footnote the Court also cited Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992). The case is analytically similar to Fairfax's Devisee, in that both concern
federal protection of antecedent state rights. But the state did not contest the existence
of the plaintiffs state Jaw property right in Lucas, focusing instead on the scope of its
power to regulate the use of the property consistent with the Takings Clause. Accordingly, the Supreme Court faced no "adequate state ground" issue.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 119.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 120
53. Since the state Jaw rulings here are plainly substantive rather than procedural, I
assume Rehnquist would, if pressed for specifics, put the case in the antecedent grounds
category.
54. Bush, 531 U.S. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 131 (Souter, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 150 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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category is of cases. But the plurality not only misapplied the
doctrines. By doing so, it carelessly handed its adversaries a
powerful weapon as well. As the dissenters said over and over
again, in procedural and fair support cases, the review of state
law is typically deferential, as the state has a strong claim to
make whatever rules it pleases on matters of state law in cases
with these characteristics. 58 Bush is actually a simple case of federal law constraining state authority, and falls within the category of cases resting on inadequate state substantive grounds.
No deference toward the state court's interpretation of state law
is called for in such a case.
The procedural and antecedent grounds fact patterns raise
subtle problems of federal-state relations. It is far harder to
fashion suitable rules for resolving such cases than it is to deal
with the other types of Supreme Court review. Compare them
with the inadequate grounds and remote premise categories.
When the state court purports to rely on a state ground, but the
judgment cannot stand without the resolution of a federal issue
inadequacy, the case for Supreme Court review of the federal issue is straightforward. Whatever else the Court should be doing,
its essential role is to vindicate federal rights. When the state's
ruling depends on a "remote federal premise," the case for federal intervention depends on the equally plain, if less compelling,
argument that federal interests should receive no more weight
than a correct reading of federal law would give them. 59
By contrast, when a litigant fails to follow a concededly
valid state procedure in asserting his federal claim, both federal
and state interests are at stake. Similarly, antecedent grounds
cases arise when a right that is created by state law is coupled
with federal protection of that right. The federal interest is not
in defining the scope of the right. If there were a federal constitutional, statutory, or common law doctrine setting up such a
right, the case would raise no hard Supreme Court review issue
at all. But in these cases the right is purely a creature of state
law. Since there is no federal interest in the question of whether
the right exists in the first place, the Supreme Court defers to the
state court on state law. And yet there is a federal interest in the
protection of the state-created right. Consequently, the review
of state court rulings on the state law issue of whether there is a

58. See, e.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 133 (Souter, 1.,
dissenting); id. at 139 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 148-51 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59. See text accompanying notes 25-29.
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right must not be too deferential. The Supreme Court must ascertain whether the state court has, under the guise of interpreting state law, in effect denied the pre-existing state-created right
the protection federal law accords it. To this end, the Court does
not usually engage in an independent examination of state law,
but instead asks whether the state law provides fair support for
the state court's ruling. 60
In the real world, the context in which these procedural
grounds and antecedent state law cases arise will matter greatly
in their resolution. It is not a coincidence that two of the cases
the plurality cited concerned litigation in southern courts over
the civil rights in the 1960s.61 At that time and place, anyone
could see that those courts would employ whatever means they
could to avoid recognizing the constitutional rights of blacks.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court approached the examination of
the state law issues with more than normal skepticism. A third
was an episode in a battle over the scope of national power, between the state of Virginia and the Supreme Court, in the early
years of the nation. 62 When there is no evidence of such "recalcitrance,"63 the state court ruling is more likely to withstand scrutiny, tho~h there are still plenty of examples of cases where it
does not.
This delicate balancing of state and federal interests is a
consequence of the complex relationship between state and federal law in procedural ground and antecedent state law cases, in
which rights are created by state law and protected by federal
law, or created by federal law and adjudicated under state procedures. When the relation between state and federal law is the
more typical arrangement, in which federal law imposes constraints of one kind or another on state law, the rationale for
"measured deference" to state court determinations disappears.
60. Compare Indiana ex rei. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) ("accord[ing] respectful consideration and great weight to the views of the state's highest
court") and Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930) ("fair
support") with Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813) (independent evaluation of state law).
61. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). SeeR. Fallon, et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System at 576-77 (cited in note 23) & n.2 (discussing the context in which these cases were
adjudicated).
.
62 Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813).
63. This is Justice Ginsburg's characterization of the state court attitude that can
give rise to reversal in such a case. See Bush, 121 S. Ct. at 549 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64. See Fallon, et al., The Federal Courts and the Federal System at 551-65 (cited in
note 23) (discussing the case law).
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The same is true of a case, in which the state court relies on a
federal premise in making state law. In these cases, the state
court's rulings on matters of federal law will receive no deference at all.
Now consider the relation between state and federal law in
Bush. Article II, whatever it may mean, does not protect a statecreated right to vote. Indeed, the background of article II suggests that the framers avoided taking a position on whether
states should use popular election to choose presidential electors.65 Article II is properly characterized as a constraint on the
way the state goes about choosing the electors. Whether it is a
very loose constraint that imposes few restrictions, or a strict one
that keeps state courts on a short leash is the central substantive
question at issue in Bush, and one that I do not reach here. The
present point is that the Bush fact pattern lacks the key attribute
of a "fair support" case, namely federal protection of an antecedent state law right. Lacking that attribute, there is no ground
for any deference at all to the state court's rulings on matters of
state law. Nor, of course, is Bush a case where federal rights are
at stake in a state case, and a state procedural default has resulted in their forfeiture.
IV
Despite these criticisms of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, he was right in his intuition that a proper resolution of the
case required some examination of the Florida Court's reasoning. In most inadequate state grounds cases the Court can take
the state court's rulings on state law at face value and focus
solely on whether those decisions are compatible with federal
law. Bush is different from other cases in this category, because
the constitutional issue at stake here is whether the Florida
Court properly applied the state law materials bearing on election contests. Though the plurality and the dissents differed on
whether the Florida Court had gone too far, they agreed that re-

65. Historical materials bearing on article II. § 1 can be found in Philip B. Kurland
and Ralph Lerner, eds., 3 The Founders' Constitution 534-61 (U. Chicago Press, 1987).
The big issue for the framers was whether the president should be elected by a plebiscite,
or by the Congress, or by some other method. Part of the compromise was to create the
electoral college, with the idea that it could at least narrow down the field, and to delegate to the state legislatures the choice of a methodology for choosing electors. The
framers seem to have contemplated that the state legislatures would be free either to pick
the electors themselves or to hold a plebiscite.
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solving this federal issue required the Court to examine the Florida Court's treatment of state law. 66
Rehnquist's error was to suppose that, in the course of examining the Florida Court's application of state law, the Supreme Court must show some deference to the state court, just
because it must do so in certain other situations. Pressed for
time, he confused the substantive article II issue with the wholly
irrelevant body of law on Supreme Court review of procedural
default and fair support/antecedent grounds cases. There is a
superficial similarity between article II issue and Supreme Court
review, for both queries demand scrutiny of state law. By coincidence, they may produce the same result in any given case.
Still, they require rather different inquiries. The federalism issues raised by Supreme Court review demand deference to state
law when a procedural default has occurred or when federal
rights depend on a state law antecedent. By contrast, article II is
a constraint on what the state court can do and article II challenges belong in the category of nondeferential cases involving
inadequate state substantive grounds. 67 While the exact content
of the limits on state courts remain uncertain after Bush, we
know that article II may demand scrutiny of the state court's
reasoning and a comparison between Florida's election law before and after the Florida Court's intervention. 68 Whatever the
66. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 114-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 127 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (Florida Court's "decisions were rooted in long-established precedent and
were consistent with the relevant statutory provisions, taken as a whole"); id. at 131
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("(n]one of the state court's interpretations is unreasonable to the
point of displacing the legislative enactment"); id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding "no cause here to believe that the members of Florida's high court have done less
than 'their mortal best to discharge their oath of office' and no cause to upset their reasoned interpretation of Florida law" (quoting Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981));
id. at 147-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (examining the state court's reasoning and finding no
"impermissible distortion" of state law).
67. Whether Article II is better viewed as a kind of "state separation of powers"
provision, as Rehnquist seemed to conceive of it, or in some other way is a question best
left for another day. In my view a strong case can be made for reversing the Florida
Court on the ground that Article II is, among other things, a safeguard against judicial
efforts to change the rules governing an election after the election has taken place. See
Michael L. Wells and Jeffry Netter, Article II and the Florida Election Case 61 Maryland
L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2002).
68. In advancing the argument that the Supreme Court must examine state law in
order to resolve the article II issue, my premise is that article II is a source of judicially
enforceable rules regulating state presidential election practices. A serious constitutional
argument can be made that the Supreme Court has no role in evaluating the o.utcome of
the state's process for choosing electors. If two (or more) sets of electors clatm to vote
for the state, it is, under this view, up to Congress to resolve the dispute. Justice Breyer,
joined on this point by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, advanced this thesis in his dissent.
See Bush, 531 U.S. at 152-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). If he is right, there is no "adequate
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precise standard by which the Florida Court's work is evaluated,
the doctrine on Supreme Court review of state judgments imposes upon the Court no obligation to defer to the Florida
Court's rulings on state law issues. George W. Bush did not
need to show that the Florida Court "impermissibly distorted" 69
state law in order to win; nor does the state ruling survive scrutiny merely because it may be a "reasonable" 70 construction of
the Florida election statute.

state ground" issue to cope with, simply because there is no Supreme Court review in the
first place.
69. ld. at 149 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70. ld. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

